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gun, seizure of such weapon is permissible. 5 14 Thus, even where

an officer is justified in leaning into an automobile and informing
a driver of a traffic violation, any items noticeable in the car
must still be "suspicious" in nature in order for officers to seize
such items.

NEW YORK COUNTY

People v. Scarborough 5 15
(printed April 28, 1994)

The defendant claimed that his right to be free from illegal
5 16
searches and seizures was violated under both the New York
and United States 5 17 Constitutions when he was arrested after a
"full blown" search of his locker contents. 5 1 8 The Criminal
Court, New York County, held that the "full blown" search of
the defendant's work locker, notwithstanding the defendant's
limited consent to a visual inspection, was violative of both the
state and federal constitutions. 5 19 Consequently, the court held
that the seizure of property therein was illegal and the evidence
520
should have been suppressed.
On July 30, 1993, while employed as a peace officer by
Barneys New York, Special Police Officer Rivera received a
telephone call from a confidential informant naming the
514. Id. at 109.
515. N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29 (Crim. Ct. New York County 1994).
516. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. Article I, § 12 provides in pertinent part:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.. . '
Id.
517. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses.
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.... ."Id.
518. Scarborough, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29.
519. Id.
520. Id.
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defendant as one of two individuals who had allegedly stolen
watches from the store, and, subsequently, placed them in his
locker. 5 2 1 Upon this information, Special Police Officer Rivera,
22
in the presence of a union delegate as required by store policy,5
asked the defendant to comply with an inspection of his
locker. 5 23 The defendant thereafter complied with the officer's
request, stating "No problem," and at which time the officer
visually inspected the contents of the locker. 524 Following the
limited visual inspection, the officer asked to examine one of the
items again, namely sneakers with paper packed in them, to
which request the defendant objected. 5 25 Upon the officer's
insistence, the defendant once again, without responding,
removed the sneakers from the locker and the paper stuffed
therein and, in turning them upside down, "two watches fell to
52 7
the floor." 526 The defendant was subsequently arrested.

The court initially stated that "[a]t issue in every suppression
hearing is whether the defendant possessed a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the area searched. .. "528 However,
even if the defendant maintained such an expectation, the court
concluded that the search could nevertheless be found reasonable
if the search was conducted with a warrant 52 9 or was recognized
under one of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule. 530
521. Id.

522. M. As part of Barneys New York's store procedures, all employees
are assigned a locker and supplied with the combination lock. Id. Both the
employee and Barneys have knowledge of the combination, however,
inspection of the locker, without the employee's consent, is limited to when the
employee is effectively terminated. Id. Under all other circumstances, the
employee and/or a union delegate must be present when the search is
performed. Id.
523. Id.
524. Id.

525. Id. The defendant stated to the police officer, "I showed you these
sneakers before." Id.
526. Id.
527. Id.

528. Id.
529. Id. See People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 52, 432 N.E.2d 745, 746,

447 N.Y.S.2d 873, 874 (1982) ("By interposing the requirement of a warrant
issued judicially, upon information attested by oath or affirmation and which
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The Scarborough court, in reaching its holding that the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, relied on the
two-part test elicited by Justice Harlan in Katz v. United
States,53 1 wherein he stated that two requirements needed to be
satisfied in determining whether the defendant maintained an
expectation of privacy. 532 The first requirement is that "a person
must have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy." 533 The second requirement includes a finding that "the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable." ' ' 534 Moreover, the Supreme Court reasoned that
when a person clearly seeks to protect something that is purely
private, even when the area might be publicly vulnerable, he may
be constitutionally protected under the Fourth Amendment. 535
In applying the Katz test to the case at bar, the Scarborough
court ruled that although the limited inspection of the defendant's
locker was reasonable, 53 6 the defendant had a subjective
expectation of privacy when he previously stuffed his sneaker
with paper "so as to secure and secrete its contents."' 537
Furthermore, "in light of the defendant's knowledge of previous
locker inspections," the court found it was "clear that the only
reason for stuffing the sneaker was to prevent others ... from

determining the nature and contents of the sneaker." 538

establishes probable cause, the [New York] State Constitution protects the
privacy interests of people of our State . . ").
530. Scarborough, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29.
531. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

532. Id. at 361.
533. Id.
534. Id..
535. Id. at 351.

536. The court analogized the defendant's expectation of privacy with that
of the defendant in People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 432 N.E.2d 745, 447
N.Y.S.2d 873 (1982). In the Belton case, the court found the police officer's
search of the defendant's jacket pocket reasonable, "as incident to [his]
arrest," after a routine speeding stop alerted the officer to the defendant's
possession of marijuana. Id. at 51-52, 432 N.E.2d at 746, 447 N.Y.S.2d at
874.
537. Scarborough, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29.
538. Id.
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The Scarborough court stated that although the visual
inspection of the locker and the sneakers by the officer was
reasonable, 53 9 the scope of the inquiry was limited to the
reasonableness of the defendant's subjective expectation of
privacy as compared to an objectively recognized exception by
society. 540 "With respect to the locker, the defendant exhibited a
subjective expectation that the locker contents would remain
private by locking it and.., one could conclude that such
expectation was objectively reasonable." 5 41 The court also noted
that the defendant's reasonable expectation to privacy was
reasonable in an objective nature as well as subjective. 542
After determining that the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the court examined whether the search
was still valid based upon the defendant's consent to the
search. 543 Relying on the New York Court of Appeals decision
in People v. Whitehurst,5 44 the court recognized that the burden
539. Id. The court found that the defendant's consent, given voluntarily as
evidenced by his statements, provided the officer with the authority to conduct
a limited visual inspection of his locker. Id.
540. id. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); People v.
Mercado, 68 N.Y.2d 874, 875, 501 N.E.2d 27, 29, 508 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421
(1986) ("[The Fourth Amendment] does not protect every subjective
expectation of privacy, but only those that society recognizes as
reasonable.. .

.");

see also People v. Kuhn, 33 N.Y.2d 203, 209, 306

N.E.2d 777, 780, 351 N.Y.S.2d 649, 653 (1973) ("In determining the
reasonableness of the intrusion, it should be tested by 'balancing the need to
search against the intrusion which the search entails.'") (citation omitted).
541. Scarborough, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29.
542. Id. "The courts have consistently held that an expectation of privacy in
containers is one which [society deems] reasonable." Id. See People v. Smith,
59 N.Y.2d 454, 458, 452 N.E.2d 1224, 1227, 465 N.Y.S.2d 896, 899 (1983)
("Although probable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed a
crime will justify the search of his person ...it will not necessarily justify the
search of a container accessible to him.').
543. Id.
544. 25 N.Y.2d 389, 391, 254 N.E.2d 905, 906, 306 N.Y.S.2d 673, 674
(1969). "Initially, the defendant carries the burden of proofwhen he challenges
the legality of a search and seizure ...but the People have the burden of
goingforward to show the legality of the police conduct in the first instance."
Id. at 391, 254 N.E.2d at 906, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 674. See Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543. 548 (1968) ("When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon
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of proof is on the People to show whether defendant's consent
was voluntary. 545 Moreover, the court determined that the
voluntariness of the defendant's consent was "based upon the
totality of the circumstances ....,546 Although the defendant's
consent may have reasonably been inferred with respect to the
limited visual inspection, the court found that he did not consent
to a "full blown" locker search.547 While "[n]o one circumstance
is determinative of the voluntariness of consent," the court
further reasoned that the defendant's objection to the subsequent
search of his locker contents and defendant's failure to respond to
the officer's request for a subsequent search of his sneaker
54 8
demonstrated the involuntary nature of his consent.
The Scarborough court cited People v. Guzman549 for the
proposition that limited consent to a search does not
automatically allow a "full blown" search. 550 The Guzman court
found that the defendant's detention for a speeding violation did
not permit the .officer to inspect the contents of his automobile

which was unrelated to the violation and an inspection of which

consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that
the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.").
545. Scarborough, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29.
546. Id.; see People v. Sora, 176 A.D.2d 1172, 1174, 575 N.Y.S.2d 970.
972 (3d Dep't 1991) ("The voluntariness of defendant's consent is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances . .

").

547. Scarborough, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29; see People v. Cohen,
58 N.Y.2d 844, 846, 446 N.E.2d 774, 775, 460 N.Y.S.2d 18, 19 (1983)
(holding that defendant's consent to initial entry into apartment did not extend
to subsequent inspections the following day).
548. Scarborough, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29. See Whitehurst. 25
N.Y.2d at 392, 254 N.E.2d at 906, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 675 ("[A]n affirmative
response ...would constitute a constitutional waiver.").

549. 153 A.D.2d 320, 551 N.Y.S.2d 709 (4th Dep't 1990).
550. See Cohen, 58 N.Y.2d at 846, 446 N.E.2d at 775, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 19
("[T]he defendant's consent to initial entry did not extend to the ones the police
effected on the following morning .

. . .");

see also People v. Estrella, 160

A.D.2d 250, 251, 553 N.Y.S.2d 358. 359 (1st Dep't 1990) (holding that
because "[the defendant] was under arrest at the time is not, by itself.
sufficient to vitiate the otherwise voluntary nature of his consent and
cooperation").
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would constitute a serious invasion of his privacy. 5 5 1 Thus, the

court found the following exchange between the police officer
and the defendant, "[d]o you mind if I take a look in your
vehicle?" ... "[n]o, I don't mind, go ahead," only allowed the

officer to inspect the defendant's car and not a complete search of
the car which would entail removing the rear seat. 552
The court, in Scarborough, similarly rejected the prosecutor's
argument that the defendant's voluntary consent to the locker
inspection should extend to the contents of containers therein. 5 53
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on testimony that the
defendant was directed to remove the sneakers from his
locker. 554 The court distinguished between a voluntary
inspection, to which request the defendant replied "No problem,"
and a "full blown" search of the contents of the locker and its
containers, to which the defendant protested. 555

The United States Constitution also supports the concept of a
limited search based on a limited consent. 556 Under the Fourth
551. Guzman, 153 A.D.2d at 322, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 711. Yhe court further
stated that:
Although under certain circumstances a police officer who has validly
arrested an occupant of an automobile may contemporaneously search
the passenger compartment including any containers found therein, this
right is limited only to situations where the police 'have reason to
believe that the car may contain evidence relatedto the crime ...
Id. at 323, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 711.
552. Id. at 324, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 712. In People v. Grajales, 136 A.D.2d
564, 523 N.Y.S.2d 560 (2d Dep't 1988), the Second Department found that
the officer's search, predicated on immigration offenses, did not afford them
the right to search the apartment further without the consent of the defendant.
Id. at 565, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
553. Scarborough, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29.
554. Id. For consent to be considered voluntary, the circumstances under
which it was given must be examined and, it must not be the result of "official
coercion, actual or implicit, overt or subtle." Id.
555. Id.
556. See United States v. White, 541 F. Supp. 1114, 1117 (N.D. I11. 1982)
("If a search is conducted pursuant to a consent, any part of the search not
within the bounds of the consent is unlawful."): United States v. Taibe, 446 F.
Supp. 1142, 1147 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that the extent of a search
conducted pursuant to a voluntary consent is limited by the bounds of the
actual consent).
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Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and article I, section 12, of the New York State
Constitution, an officer's search is limited to either the infraction
for which the defendant is being investigated, absent a warrant or
exception under the Exclusionary Rule, or, alternatively, to the
"scope and duration" of the defendant's consent. 557 The language
of both provisions precluding unlawful searches and seizures is
identical .558

Under federal constitutional law, as well as New York
constitutional law, it appears that as long as the officer acts in
compliance with an objectively reasonable societal expectation of
privacy, the search will be lawful. Therefore, both the New York
State and the United States Constitutions prohibit police officers
from conducting "full blown" searches of a defendant's property
and containers therein, where there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy and the consent has been limited.

557. See People v. Guzman, 153 A.D.2d 320, 551 N.Y.S.2d 709 (4th
Dep't 1990).
558. See People v. Smith, 59 N.Y.2d 454, 460, 452 N.E.2d 1224, 1228,

465 N.Y.S.2d 896, 900 (The court of appeals has "repeatedly recognized that
the similar language used in section 12 of article 1 of the State Constitution
means that it should be interpreted in the same manner as the Fourth
Amendment.. .

.")

(Jasen, J., concurring).
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